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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sy scorn's claim is barred because it was a contractor and it performed work in the
construction trades without being licensed. The court's legal conclusion that Sy scorn was not
a contractor because it was an agent is error. This Court should hold that Sy scorn was an
unlicensed contractor subject to no statutory or common law exceptions, and that its
counterclaim is therefore barred under U.C.A. § 58-55-604 (1995).
In addition, Syscom has all but conceded that it breached a material condition precedent
by failing to account for the money, as required under the Management Agreement
("Contract"), and therefore it is entitled to no recovery. It also concedes that it breached the
Contract by charging Cellcom for tech hours. Finally, the court abused its discretion in failing
to grant the motion for a new trial. In any event, it should have recused itself for the reasons
set forth in Cellcom's Opening Brief.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT COMMITTED LEGAL ERROR WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT SYSCOM NEED NOT BE LICENSED
UNDER THE UTAH CONSTRUCTION TRADES LICENSING
ACT.
Syscom's Counterclaim is barred if the services giving rise to the Counterclaim
required a license under the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act. U.C.A. § 58-55-604
(1995). Licenses are required for "any person engaged in the construction trades licensed
under [the Act] or as a contractor regulated under [the Act]." U.C.A. § 58-55-305 (1995).
Syscom's activities required a license because it was "engaged in the construction trades," and
-1-

because it acted as a "contractor" under U.C.A. § 58-55-305 and U.C.A. § 58-55-102(7)
(1995).
In American Rural Cellular v. Systems Communications. 890 P.2d 1035 (Utah App.
1995) ("CeUcomJ"), this Court reversed and remanded "for detailed findings on whether
Syscorn was engaged as a contractor within the statutory definition. The trial court's finding
should resolve this issue unequivocally, stating the specific subsidiary facts supporting its
ultimate factual determinations." (citations omitted.) KL at 1039. The trial court did not do
that. It never mentions the Utah Construction Trades Licensing Act (the "Act") in its
analysis. It never explains how Sy scorn's construction of three buildings, fences, many
antennas, three towers, and roads did not fall within the definition of "construction trade"
under U.C.A. § 58-55-102(6) (1995), the performance of which requires a license. It focused
only on whether Sy scorn was a "contractor" and reverted to its conclusory mantra that Sy scorn
was not a contractor, but was instead a "participant" and an "agent." (September 18, 1995
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1 1; R. 1033.)*

x

When Cellcom's counsel received the record in order to prepare its Opening Brief, this
was the only Finding of Fact and Conclusion of Law and Judgment that had been signed by the
Court. Although on November 9, 1995, as part of its Ruling denying post-trial motions, the
Court indicated that it was going to sign Sy scorn's proposed findings and conclusions, those
findings and conclusions had not been signed when Cellcom's counsel received the record to
prepare its Opening Brief. Cellcom's Opening Brief consequently focused on the only signed
findings and conclusions in the file, those signed on September 18, 1995. When Cellcom's
counsel received the record to prepare this Reply, the November 1995 Findings and Conclusions
were signed and dated November 9, 1995. To the extent the November 1995 Findings make
material additional findings, they will be addressed in this Reply.
Not a single finding dated November 1995 carries a citation to the record.
-2-

The court cites no subsidiary facts to support its conclusion that Syscom was not a
contractor. Despite this, and in an effort to bolster the court's barren findings, Syscom cites
this court to additional findings dated November 9, 1995. (R. 1330.) These findings,
however, do not cite the record. Nonetheless, Syscom states that "the court specifically found
that Syscom was not a contractor covered by the Act (R. 1319, 1324, 1327) [Nov. '95
Findings]." (Syscom's Brief, p. 18.) There is nothing on R. 1319 that mentions anything
about whether Syscom was or was not a contractor under the Act. The findings on R. 1324
carry no record cites. Their only possible relevance could be the references to the
Management Agreement in Findings 25-28 that list Syscom's duties. The findings are
misleading as they fail to mention Syscom's duties to "manage the construction . . . an
independent contractor" (Ex. 1, Recitals 1f D), or "as an independent contractor [to] . .
.construct the cellular system," (icL at 1f 2(b)(iii)), or to "supervise construction of the cellular
system." QdL at f 4(k).)
The only other possible relevant finding, without citation, is a conclusion that "the
Management Agreement does not recite that Syscom is a licensed contractor nor did Syscom
represent in any other way that it was licensed as a construction contractor." (November 9,
1995 Findings, 1f 7, R. 1324.) This finding is similar to no. 12 on R. 1327 that Syscom
did not hold itself out as a licensed contractor in the construction trades
and ARC did not come to Syscom because it considered it a licensed
contractor. The people initially hired by ARC to create the telephone
company were not licensed contractors in Utah or any other state, but
rather were attorneys and engineers. (November 9, 1995 Findings of
Fact, 1 12, R. 1327.)

-3-

A finding without reference to the record is no help. Even if the finding had some support in
the record, it is irrelevant for the Act does not require that an unlicensed contractor
specifically represent that it was "licensed" to violate the Act's licensing requirements.
U.C.A. § 58-55-102(7)(b) and (e) (1995).
In a further effort to bolster the court's defective findings, Syscom states that the
court's conclusion that Syscom was not a contractor, was "based on specific findings of fact
including the following:" [listing ten paragraphs of supposed facts]. (Syscom's Brief, pp. 1820.) None support the court's conclusion that Syscom was not a contractor, and none carry
any cites to where the court made any such findings. Since they are not findings, the cites are
simply to evidence that support the court's September 18, 1995 finding that "in some
instances, particularly related to the actual physical construction, Syscom acted as an agent of
the plaintiff." (September 18, 1995 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 1 1, R. 1033.)2
The court's holding that an agent doing construction need not be licensed is contrary to
the Act, and interpretive case law. (Opening Brief, pp. 24-26.) Syscom all but concedes that
courts do not rely on labels attached to relationships between owners and contractors, but
instead look at the actual work performed to determine whether a license was required. Reidy
v. BlackwelL 681 P.2d 916 (Ariz. App. 1983). This approach is consistent with the purpose
of the Act, and should be adopted here to reject the court's conclusion that an agent doing

2

In Finding No. 32 of the November 1995 Findings, the court states that the $10,000
monthly fee was substantially a fee for radio and telephone engineering and management
services." The record, however, is devoid of any evidence that supports the claim that Syscom
had any radio or telephone engineering licenses. Specifically, the Management Agreement does
not mention radio and telephone engineering services.
-4-

construction work need not be licensed. In addition, Syscom, by its silence, acknowledges the
agency law cited on pages 26 through 30 of the Opening Brief, that there was no general
agency or special agency relationship between Cellcom and Syscom for purposes of
construction because, among other things, Cellcom did not control Syscom's daily activities
during the construction phase of the project. Glover v. Boy Scouts of America. 923 P.2d
1383 (Utah 1996). The court's conclusion that Syscom need not be licensed because it was
Cellcom's agent is, therefore, error.
Undaunted and in a further effort to create factual findings where none exist, Syscom
states that Syscom did not submit a construction bid, and therefore was not a contractor.
(Syscom Brief, p. 21.) Syscom cites to R. 765-676 [sic] [766], where Mr. Sorensen of
Syscom testifies that Marie Bagshaw told him "give me the best numbers that you can . . .
She wanted to know how much it was going to cost to . . . build the cellular system." (R.
766.) Despite this, Mr. Sorensen testifies that he did not consider his numbers to be bids, but
instead calls them estimates:
Q:

What did you consider them as?

A:

Estimates. With the information I had at the time, those were the best
estimates that I could come up with to tell her what the third-party
expenses would be.

Q:

You better describe these third-party expenses. What was included in
the bids or the estimates?

A:

All right. They were buildings, three of them. There were three
towers. There was fencing. There was grade work. There was
antennas and transmission line.

Q:

You're talking about the physical construction of those three sites?

-5-

A:

Yeah, Except for the electronic equipment that went inside of them.

Q:

None of that was included in your estimates?

A:

Well, no, it wasn't. R. 766-767.

Nomenclature aside, the numbers were given by Syscom to Cellcom and reasonably relied
upon by Cellcom to inform its lender how much it would need to build the system. It is
persuasive evidence that Syscom "represented] [itself] to be a contractor by advertising or any
other means" within the meaning of U.C.A. § 58-55-102(7)(b) (1995).
Syscom also claims that because under the Management Agreement Syscom was to
perform other tasks besides building the system, that it somehow was not a contractor when it
built the system. It, in fact, relies on paragraph E of the Recitals to the Management
Agreement whereby Cellcom and Syscom state that together they desire to take advantage of
the "knowledge, experience, business and community contacts and assets of Syscom" in order
to build the system. Nothing in that paragraph suggests that Cellcom wanted to take advantage
of Syscom's experience in the "telephone business" as asserted by Syscom in its brief.
(Syscom Brief, p. 20.)3 This statement in the Recitals is only relevant to Cellcom's reliance

3

In Finding No. 5 of the November 1995 Findings, the court states that Syscom "is a
wireless telephone and radio company." Marshaling the evidence in support of this shows that
it has no support at all. Mr. Sorensen testified, "We were a telephone and radio company . . .
We installed antennas, transmission line. We did microwave radio communications point to point.
We did point to multi-point communications." R. 752. Nothing on the record indicates that
Syscom "operated radio and telephone transmission towers for its telephone customers." In
contrast, Marie Bagshaw testified that Syscom had no experience in the cellular telephone business
or with cellular telephones, R. 540-541, and in fact Cellcom trained Mr. Sorensen in the technical
aspects of the cellular telephone industry. R. 771.
-6-

on Syscom's assertions that it had the expertise to build the system. It does not suggest that
Cellcom was itself capable of building the system; it was not.
Syscom also puts great weight in the fact that Syscom's compensation included both the
monthly $10,000 fee, plus other incentive compensation in the form of some revenue sharing
and a fraction of proceeds should the system be sold. From this, Syscom leaps to the
conclusion that Cellcom and Syscom were partners. However, Mr. Sorensen admitted that
Syscom and Cellcom were not partners. (R. 727.) The evidence is not relevant to the issue
of whether Syscom was a contractor for purposes of building the system, and whether its work
fell within the definition of construction trade.
Overwhelming evidence proves that Syscom was engaged as a contractor within the
Utah Code, which defines contractor as: (1) "any person who represents himself to be a
contractor by advertising or any other means;" U.C.A. § 58-55-102(7)(b) (1995), and (2) "a
construction manager who performs management and counseling services on a construction
project for a fee." KL § 58-55-102(7)(e) (1995). Syscom demonstrated its ability to build
proper buildings by showing Cellcom one it had already built. (Opening Brief, Facts H 1516.) Syscom informed Cellcom that it had built buildings and towers in order to "convince"
Cellcom to hire Syscom. (IdL at H 15, 17.) In the Management Agreement, it described itself
as an "independent contractor" for purposes of constructing the system. (Ex. 1, Recitals 1 D;
1 2(b)(iii) and f 4(k).) Syscom, therefore, "represent[ed] [itself] to be a contractor by
advertising or any other means" under U.C.A. § 58-55-102(7)(b) (1995).
Syscom was also a contractor because it performed construction management and
counseling services for a fee under U.C.A. § 58-55-102(7)(e) (1995). The contract
-7-

specifically required Syscom to construct the buildings and towers. (Ex. 1, pp. 3-4). Syscom
provided a detailed bid in order to get the job. (Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, H 10). It
hired and paid subcontractors to perform various tasks. (kL, H 18, 20). On the building
permits, it listed itself as the general and electrical contractor. (IdL, H 23). Syscom paid
itself $10,000 a month from the construction account.

(Id., 1 23). Mr. Sorensen personally

supervised the work, and the crews who performed the work. (IdL, f 25). Finally, Syscom
saw itself as a contractor when it employed the contractors' lever, the mechanics lien. (Id..
1 42.) Syscom was never licensed, therefore the trial court erred when it determined that it
could recover. U.C.A. § 58-55-604 (1995).
The simple rule is if one performs acts in the "construction trade" under U.C.A. 5855-301 (1995), one must be licensed to claim compensation. The overwhelming evidence here
is that Syscom's construction of three buildings, roads, fences, three towers, many antennas,
and incidental improvements to the property were acts within the definition of "construction
trades" under Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-102(6) (1995).4 A license was required.

POINT II
NO STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW EXCEPTIONS APPLY
TO RELIEVE SYSCOM OF ITS OBLIGATION TO BE
LICENSED.

4

Other provisions of the Act leave no doubt of the legislature's intent to outlaw Syscom's
conduct. The Act defines unlawful conduct to be, among other things, hiring unlicensed persons
[Martinsen] U.C.A. § 58-55-501(3) (1995); obtaining a building permit without being licensed.
[Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, If 21, 22 ] U.C.A. § 58-55-501(4) (1995); and submitting
a bid without a license [Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, 1 10] U.C.A. § 58-55-501(8) (1995).
These violations are Class A misdemeanors. U.C.A. § 58-55-503(1) (1995).
-8-

Sy scorn asserts for the first time that "[Cellcom] knew that Sy scorn was not licensed
under the Construction Trades Licensing Statute, and yet it sought out Sy scorn and contracted
with it and should not be allowed to raise this defense." (Syscorn Brief, p. 22.) There is no
factual basis cited for this assertion. The court never made this finding or conclusion.
Moreover, there is no evidence that Cellcom knew that Syscom was an unlicensed contractor.
Its waiver argument is meritless.
A.

Cellcom Was Within the Class of Persons Needing the Act's Protection.

Syscom asserts that Cellcom was not within the class of persons to be protected by the
licensing requirement. (Syscom Brief, p. 22.) "In this case, licensed contractors and professionals were hired to survey, engineer, construct buildings and do electrical work. ARC did
not look to Syscom for those skills or qualifications." (Syscom Brief, p. 23.) This assertion
is inconsistent with the court's sparse findings, that Syscom "did the electrical" work
(September 18, 1995 Findings and Conclusions, if 1), that Syscom "constructed the buildings"
(Id. at f 2), and that under the Management Agreement "Syscom had the responsibility to
'manage and implement the building of the system.'" (IcL at 1 5.)
Significantly, the court makes no finding in its September 18, 1995 Findings &
Conclusions that licensed contractors were hired. Nor does the court make any finding in
September 1995 that licensed professionals were hired to "survey, engineer and construct
buildings and do electrical work."
The court's Findings and Conclusions dated November 9, 1995, however, contain
references to some of these allegations. None carry a cite to the record, but marshaling the
evidence demonstrates that they are either clearly erroneous or irrelevant. For example,
-9-

Finding 9 of the November 9, 1995 Findings and Conclusions (R. 1328) states that "ARC first
hired a law firm and an engineering firm from the eastern United States to design and
construct the system." Testimony established that engineers did radio frequency studies to
determine the best locations for the towers. (R. 532.) Mr. Sorensen testified that he met with
Mr. Adcock, the engineer who did the radio frequency studies. (R. 753-755.)
In addition, paragraph 14 of the November 1995 Findings (R. 1327) states:
"Mr. Sorensen, under guidance and direction from engineers hired by ARC, located lands for
cell sites, secured the lands, and hired contractors to construct the buildings." As stated, the
record shows that engineers located the best sites for the towers. That is all they did. There
is no evidence supporting the claim that Cellcom's engineers supervised anything that Syscom
did. In fact, the engineers' work was completed in 1989 (R. 754), while construction did not
start until 1990. (R. 530, Ex. 6.) Syscom asserts that the engineers supervised Syscom in its
construction of the buildings, citing T. 248 and 249. (R. 768-769.) Nothing on those pages
even suggests that engineers guided and directed Syscom as Syscom hired contractors to build
the buildings. There is simply no evidence that the professional engineers hired to determine
the best locations for the cell sites had anything to do with the construction of the buildings,
towers and antennas.
Moreover, there was no evidence that licensed contractors were hired to construct the
buildings. Syscom relies on the November 1995 Findings and Conclusions, particularly
Finding 16:
Dennis Martinsen, working under the Utah Contractors License of Martinsen
Construction, License No. 0000151826, did the construction of the buildings
and the base for the towers. The electric work was performed by D&D
-10-

Electric, which owns License No. 0000444360. Any work performed by
Syscom employees on the building was under the direction and control of
Martinsen.
(November 1995 Findings and Conclusions, f 16, R. 1326.) Marshaling the evidence
demonstrates that it is clearly erroneous. On R. 703 Mr. Sorensen testified that he hired
Dennis Martinsen and D&D Electric. There is no mention of any licenses. On R. 747 and
748, Mr. Sorensen stated: "I thought he [Martinsen] was licensed. I did not check the
register to see if he was licensed." He also testified that he never saw a copy of his license.
Further, Exhibit 70, a State of Utah Department of Commerce License #0000151826 is
a license for Lynn Martinsen Contractors. The license is no proof that Dennis Martinsen was
licensed, as it was not issued to him. Nor is there any evidence that Lynn Martinsen had
anything to do with the job. Moreover, the license was issued on September 11, 1991, months
after the project was completed in early 1991.5 Finally, there is no evidence introduced at trial
that D & D Electric was licensed.
There is also no support for the finding that "Syscom's employees were all the time
supervised under the direction and control of Martinson." Syscom cites to T. 317 (R. 837)
and T. 318 (R. 838) for this proposition. Nothing on the cited pages say anything about

5

Syscom abandons its reliance on Exhibit 70, no doubt because under the Utah
Administrative Code, the license category to which Lynn Martinsen Contractors was entitled to
perform work did not cover this job. It carried the classification BlOO, which is "general
building" that does not include commercial or industrial building. Utah Administrative Code
Rule, R. 156-55(a)-301. It also carried classification S201, which is "residential electrical
contractor" that, by its terms, excludes commercial and industrial electrical work. ]<L As this
was a commercial or industrial project, even Lynn Martinsen Contractors was not licensed to
perform the work.
-11-

Dennis Martinsen's supervision of Syscom's employees. No other evidence supports this
assertion.
In further support of its contention that Cellcom was not within the class of persons to
be protected by the licensing requirements, Syscom states, without record cite, that "ARC was
in charge of the project, reserved the right to make all decisions as to how the work proceeded
and the right to direct expenditures of money. It did not rely on Syscom as an independent
contractor." (Syscom Brief, p. 23.) As indicated in Cellcom's Opening Brief, Cellcom
contractually reserved its right to "control . . . business assets, facilities, operations, and
policy decisions." (Ex. 1.) Significantly, Cellcom did not expressly reserve to it the right to
control construction activities. Instead, the Management Agreement provided that Syscom as
an "independent contractor" would supervise construction and keep Cellcom apprised of the
status of the construction. (Ex. 1, Recitals 1 D; f 2(b)(iii); % 4(k).) Cellcom allowed Syscom
to decide how the construction money would be spent. No one from Cellcom controlled or
supervised any aspect of Syscom's construction operation. No one from Cellcom visited Utah
during construction.
The undisputed facts demonstrate that Cellcom trusted Syscom to build the buildings
and towers and antennas. It entrusted Syscom with hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Consequently, Syscom's assertion that "[Cellcom] did not rely on Syscom as an independent
contractor" is without merit.
In Cellcom L Syscom put great reliance on the fact that two of its officers held FCC
private radio licenses, and that these licenses allowed them to ignore the state licensing

-12-

requirements, especially in the construction trades. This assertion is repeated in the present
appeal:
The general law is that persons whose activities are specifically licensed under
other statutory provisions are exempt from the general license requirements
imposed on contractors.
(Syscom Brief, p. 24.) For support, Syscom cites 19 A.L.R. 3rd 1407 (1968), but this
annotation only lists cases where under unique factual circumstances courts have allowed
recovery by unlicensed individuals under limited circumstances not present in this case.
Syscom also states that "Where one is licensed federally to perform the work involved,
the protection sought to be given by the State Licensing Statute is available and the courts have
held that failure to license at the state level will not be allowed as a defense for payments for
work. See Wallich v. Salkin. 219 Cal. App.2d 157, 33 Cal. Rptr. 125 (1963)." The cited
case does not support the proposition. In Wallich. an owner contracted with a architect to
design and supervise the construction of an apartment house. The owner then refused to pay,
claiming that the architect was acting as a contractor when supervising the construction of the
apartment house and, because the architect did not have a contractor's license, he was barred
from recovery. The trial court and appellate court soundly rejected the claim, holding that
"such supervision is properly within the scope of [the architect's] professional capacities."
The architect's license allowed him to supervise construction. Consequently, the cited
authority has absolutely nothing to do with Syscom's assertion that a FCC private radio license
trumps the Utah Construction Trade Licensing Act and the state's police power to regulate
building contractors.

-13-

Moreover, this Court has already rejected Syscom's reliance on its FCC private radio
licenses. "The problem with reliance on Mr. Sorensen's FCC license is that the license does
not appear in any way to authorize an individual to construct buildings, or otherwise take on
the responsibilities of a general contractor." American Rural Cellular v. Systems
Communications. 890 P.2d 1035, 1041 n.2 (Utah App. 1995).
B.

Common Law Exceptions Do Not Apply.

The common-law exceptions do not apply. They "are all grounded in the notion that
there is no need for rigid insistence on proper licensure when the public is otherwise protected
from the harm that the licensing statute was designed to prevent, that is inept and financially
irresponsible builders." American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1040. Generally, several of
the factors must be present to find that the party is "otherwise protected from the harm"
visited by inept and financially irresponsible contractors. None of the four factors listed by
this Court apply.
The first factor asks whether the party "possesses knowledge and expertise in the
[construction] field." IdL at 1040. No evidence indicates that Cellcom had any knowledge,
much less expertise in the field. All the relevant evidence indicated otherwise, that Cellcom
did not know anything about constructing buildings and towers and antennas and roads and
fences. (Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, t 7). Cellcom had to rely on Syscom's expertise.
The second factor asks whether the work of the unlicensed contractor was supervised
by a licensed contractor. American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1040. It is undisputed that
Syscom was supervised by no one, not even Cellcom. (Opening Brief, Statement of Facts, f f
25-26).
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Third, courts consider the reason the contractor was unlicensed; whether the skilled
contractor let his license lapse, or in good faith believed he was covered by his partner's
license. American Rural Cellular. 890 P.2d at 1040. Here, no one at Syscom ever had a
contractor's license, nor did it offer any reason why it operated without a licensed. This
factor does not apply.
Fourth, courts determine whether the party relied on competence inferred from the
unlicensed person's advertised status as a general contractor, and whether a performance bond
protected the owner. QcL at 1041.) No performance bond was issued. It is undisputed that
Cellcom reasonably and heavily relied on Syscom's representations that it could do the job,
that it had done similar jobs, and that Cellcom could trust and rely on Syscom. (Opening
Brief, Statement of Facts, ff 15-17.) It received a detailed bid from Syscom, leading
Cellcom to believe that Syscom knew what it was doing. (IcL at f 10). It relied on the bid in
gaining Motorola's financing. (Id at f 8-10). In agreeing to finance the system, Motorola
reasonably relied on Syscom and its bid as well.
None of these factors apply, demonstrating that Cellcom was within the class of
persons the act was designed to protect from inept and financially irresponsible contractors.
Syscom was the archetypal inept and financially irresponsible contractor. It put the hard sell
on Cellcom, gained its trust, and landed the contract. Although Syscom managed to erect three
building and the towers, it did so only marginally well. Critically, it was so financially inept
that it lost all track of $376,518.93 without so much as an accounting or explanation. Not
satisfied, it filed three baseless mechanic's liens, claiming even more than it had already
squandered. Cellcom needed the protection of the Act.
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C.

The Public Utility Exception Does Not Apply.

Syscom asserts that it is exempt under the Public Utility Exception to the licensing
requirement6 that states: "public utilities operating under the rules of the Public Service
Commission on construction work incidental to their own business [are exempt from
licensure]." U.C.A. § 58-55-305(3) (1995). Several independent reasons demonstrate that the
exception does not apply. First, and most significant, Syscom failed to plead or prove that the
exception applied. The exception did not even occur to Syscom's counsel until closing
argument (R. 862), when, for the first time, Syscom raised the exception.
Consequently, Cellcom never had the opportunity to do discovery on the exception, to
disprove that Syscom was a public utility, operating under the rules of the Public Service
Commission. It never had the opportunity to brief whether this exception applies to situations
like this. Cellcom's due process rights were abridged when the Court entered judgment on a
theory that was never pled, discovered or proven at trial.
Second, Syscom produced no evidence that it was "operating under the rules of the
Public Service Commission." U.C.A. § 58-55-305(3) (1995). For example, Public Service
Commission Rules require that "Each public utility shall file a report with the Commission, at
least thirty days prior to beginning construction [by the utility . ] . . . " Utah Administrative
Code Rule, R. 746-401-3. Syscom introduced no evidence that such report was filed with the
Public Utility Commission for this construction job. It is obvious that Syscom was not and did
not consider itself controlled by the rules of the Public Utility Commission. Consequently, as
6

Although Syscom cites are to the former statute (§ 58-55-1 et seq. (1994)) the renumbered
statutes lists the Public Utility Exception at U.C.A. § 58-55-305(3) (1995).
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a matter of law, Syscom failed to prove an essential element of the Public Utility Exception.
It is, therefore, not entitled to the protection of the exception.
Third, there is no evidence that the construction work performed for Cellcom was
"construction work incidental to their own business." U.C.A. § 58-55-305(3) (1995).
Syscom's business was "installing and servicing two-way and microwave equipment,
operating] [a] private paging system and . . . leasing communication sites to private radio
licensee." [Ex. 1, Management Agreement, Recitals f B.] It was not in the business of
building systems for cellular companies. Importantly, the exception cannot allow one public
utility to do construction work for another public utility without a contractor's license. For in
this instance, the public utility doing the construction is not doing work incidental to its own
business, but instead is acting as a contractor building plants and lines for other entities. The
Public Utility Exception does not apply.
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POINT III
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD HAVE BEEN GRANTED.
For years Cellcom has been trying to get the court to objectively review the evidence.
It succeeded in reversing the first judgment, but the court failed to thoroughly examine the
record, or even consider Cellcom's exhaustive proposed findings. In neither its September
1995 Findings or its November Findings, does it even mention Cellcom's claim that Syscorn
breached material conditions precedent by failing to account for hundreds of thousands of
dollars. Nor does it address Cellcom's claim that Sy scorn breached the contract by charging
Cellcom for tech hours to the tune of over $30,000. It seems as if the court made up its mind
years ago that Sy scorn ought to win, and that despite evidence and law to the contrary, and
despite directives from this court, the trial court is not interested in changing its conclusion. A
new trial is then necessary to force the court to examine the evidence fairly.
Syscom claims an affidavit was not filed to explain why the newly discovered evidence
was not presented at trial. It ignores Mr. O'Neill's exhaustive affidavits that explain why the
evidence was not available at trial. (R. 1369, 1365, and 1397). The trial court ignored this
affidavit as well. A new trial is therefore necessary to fully and fairly protect Cellcom's rights
and claims.

POINT IV
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE RECUSED ITSELF.
A.

Cellcom Followed Correct Procedure in Filing the Motion to Disqualify.
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Syscom's primary objection to Cellcom's Motion to Disqualify is that Cellcom failed to
follow Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 63(b), requiring an affidavit and a statement of good faith
when filing motions to disqualify based on bias or prejudice. The court did not deny the
motion on this basis. (R. 1456.) Moreover, Rule 63(b) limits its application to motions based
upon bias or prejudice:
Whenever a party to any action or proceeding . . . shall make and file an
affidavit that the judge before whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or
heard has a bias or prejudice. . . . Every such affidavit shall state the facts
and the reasons for belief that such bias or prejudice exists. . . . (Emphasis
added).
Cellcom's motion did not allege bias or prejudice. Rather, it sought disqualification
based on Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-l(l)(a) and (c), requiring disqualification of a judge in a case
"in which he is interested," or where a judge has previously served as counsel to a party; and
on Canon 2 of the Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, warning judges to avoid even "the
appearance" of impropriety.
B.

Cellcom Has Not Waived Its Right to Move for Disqualification Based Upon
the Appearance of Impropriety.

The court denied the motion, in part, because of "the lateness of the time in which it
was filed." (R. 1456.) This was error since a motion that a judge should be disqualified
based upon the appearance of impropriety cannot be waived. In Scott v. United States. 559
A.2d 745 (D.C. App. 1988), the defendant moved to disqualify a judge on the ground that the
judge discussed employment options with the Department of Justice during the defendant's
prosecution by the U.S. Attorney's office. Six months after learning of the judge's
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employment negotiations defendant moved to disqualify based upon the appearance of
impropriety. The court rejected the prosecution's waiver argument:
the canons governing judicial conduct implicitly recognize some appearances of
impropriety are so compelling that, given the purposes of the Canons, they can
never be deemed waived or harmless,
Scott, 599 A.2d at 750-51.
Given Judge Anderson's prior involvement with the defendants, and potential financial
interest in the case, the appearance of impropriety was too serious to be waived. Syscorn's
reliance on Madsen v. Prudential Fed. Sav. & Loan. 767 P.2d 538 (Utah 1988) and Onyeabor
v. Pro Roofing. Inc.. 787 P.2d 525 (Utah App. 1990), to bolster its waiver argument is
misplaced since neither concerned a motion based on the appearance of impropriety, but
instead involved motions based upon bias or prejudice.
In any event, Cellcom timely moved to disqualify. Syscom concedes that Cellcom first
learned of the Stock Purchase Agreement in late July 1995. (Affidavit of Andrew M. Morse,
t 3, R. 1341.) Before filing the motion to disqualify, Cellcom's counsel had to contact
Cellcom's trial counsel to ascertain if they knew of the Stock Purchase Agreement, or if Judge
Anderson disclosed his firm's involvement with the defendants. (LcL at t 7.) Cellcom's
counsel immediately contacted one of Cellcom's trial counsel, M. David Eckersley of Prince,
Yeates & Geldzahler, and learned that he knew nothing of Judge Anderson's prior involvement
with Syscom. (Id.) However, the whereabouts of Cellcom's other trial attorney, Donald
Schow, formerly of Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler, were unknown. Mr. Eckersley contacted
Cellcom's counsel on October 3, 1995 to say he had tracked down Mr. Schow and that Mr.
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Schow also knew nothing of Judge Anderson's firm's representation of Syscom. (IcL at f 9.)
Cellcom filed its motion to disqualify in October 12, 1995 (R. 1049).
To bolster its claim that the motion was untimely, Syscom asserts that
between the time [Cellcom] learned of the [stock purchase] agreement and the
time it filed its motion, it made and submitted its proposed findings of fact,
submitted briefs, filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement, filed two
motions for new trials and filed a motion to amend and reconsider Judge
Anderson's decision. Only after an unfavorable decision and rulings denying
those motions, did ARC file its motion to disqualify.
(Syscom's Brief, pp. 30-31.) Syscom misstates the record. Cellcom, in fact, moved to
disqualify within nine days of gathering the facts upon which the Motion was based. Even
Judge Anderson noted that Cellcom's counsel "didn't have a fast way to determine the
information." (R. 1458.)7

7

After receiving the Stock Purchase Agreement in late July 1995, without prior knowledge
that Judge Anderson was, in fact, the Anderson in the law firm of Beaslin & Anderson that
represented Syscom (R. 1341, % 2), and before October 3, 1995, when Cellcom learned that Judge
Anderson had not disclosed his appearance of impropriety, Cellcom filed a motion to enforce the
settlement agreement on July 28, 1995. (R. 937.) It also filed proposed Findings of Fact and
Memorandum of Points and Authority as required by the court. Cellcom also moved to reopen
the case under Rule 59, and filed a motion to reopen and take additional evidence on
September 15, 1995. Plaintiff received the judge's 9/18/95 ruling on 9/20/95. On October 3,
1995, Cellcom determined from Mr. Eckersley that he had finally reached co-counsel,
Mr. Schow, and that Judge Anderson had not disclosed his firm's prior representation of Syscom.
(R. 1340.) A motion to disqualify was filed on 10/12/95.
Only after the motion to disqualify Judge Anderson did Cellcomfilea motion to reconsider
the judge's ruling of 9/18/95, an Objection to Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law
submitted by Syscom, a Rule 59 motion for a new trial, a Memorandum of Law supporting
Cellcom's Rule 59 Motions, and various other motions. Consequently, Syscom is mistaken when
it asserts that Cellcom waited to move to disqualify until after itfiledtwo motions for a new trial,
a motion to amend or reconsider the Judge's decision, and received unfavorable rulings on those
motions.
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Syscorn also argues that Cellcom should have known about Judge Anderson's
"involvement near the beginning of the lawsuit." In the quoted section of Mr. Sorensen's
deposition [which is not part of the trial record] he admits that he had sold his stock to
Sy scorn. He does not disclose that Judge Anderson represented Sy scorn or Rod Hauer.
Further inquiry into that transaction was not relevant to the case and was nondiscoverable.
What is clear, though, is that Mr. McKeachnie knew from long before the deposition of Mr.
Sorensen, that Beaslin & Anderson had represented Syscom in the Stock Purchase Agreement.
Mr. McKeachnie, apparently, knew more than even Judge Anderson about this transaction, but
kept quiet. His assertion that Cellcom sat on its rights, is, at best, disingenuous and should be
rejected.
The court reasoned that recusal was not necessary since he did not know at the time of
his firm's representation of Syscom and Mr. Hauer. The court misunderstands the law that
imputes to Judge Anderson all knowledge of his two-man law firm. Smith v. Whatcott. 757
F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1985). In addition, Judge Anderson's knowledge and intent are
irrelevant, as the test is not subjective but objective. Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisitions
Corporation. 486 U.S. 847, 859 (1988) ("Scienter is not an element of a violation of
§ 455(a)"). The objective test is: "[C]ould a significant minority of the lay community . . .
reasonably question the court's impartiality?" Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania
Transportation Authority. 330 Pa. Super. 420, 458, 479 A.2d 973, 992 (1984). Plaintiff's
authority otherwise is irrelevant as it concerns motions based on bias and prejudice, not the
motion here which is based on the appearance of impartiality and other grounds.
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This court should order the trial court to recuse, and remedy the harm from the court's
failure to recuse, by vacating the judgment. The Supreme Court in Liljeberg. 486 U.S. 847
(1988) held that the harmless error test was inappropriate where the appearance of impropriety
taints the entire proceeding:
In determining whether a judgment should be vacated for violation of § 455, it
is appropriate to consider [a] the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular
case, [b] the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases,
and [c] the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process.
We must continuously bear in mind that 'to perform its high function in the best
way' justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.
Liljeberg. 486 U.S. at 864.
Under the first Liljeberg factor, vacatur is mandated because of the risk of injustice to
American Rural Cellular if the tainted judgment stands. No party who voluntarily refers its
dispute to the civil justice system, reasonably believing that an impartial judge would hear the
case, should have its case tried instead to judge who, months earlier, was half of a two-man
firm that represented the defendant, and who has a potential financial interest in the case.
Here Judge Anderson acted as a trier of fact, the judge of credibility, the only person who
could decide whom to believe and whom not to believe, and who apparently disregarded all of
the evidence submitted by the plaintiff, believing everything submitted by Syscom, its former
president, Mr. Sorensen, and its current president, Rodney Hauer, a client of his former firm.
These circumstances would cause any reasonable person to have qualms about the judge's
impartiality.
As the Supreme Court explained in Liljeberg:
The problem, however, is that people who have not served on the bench are all
too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of judges.
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The very purpose of § 455(a) is to promote confidence in the judiciary by
avoiding even the appearance of impropriety whenever possible.
See S. Rep. No. 93-419, at 5; H.R. Rep. 93-1453 at 5. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition
Corp.. 486 U.S. 847, 865-866 (1988). Even Judge Anderson conceded that these
circumstances "may create an appearance of impropriety." [R. 1458].
The second Liljeberg factor is also satisfied, since there is a substantial risk that denial
of relief will produce injustice in other cases.
Enforcing the language and intent of Canons may prevent an abuse of justice in
some future case, by encouraging a judge or litigant to more carefully examine
possible grounds for disqualification and to promptly discourage them when
discovered.
Liljeberg. 486 U.S. 847, 868 (1988).
Judge Anderson conceded that "that kind of involvement [at issue here] . . . may create
an appearance of impropriety" and it is a "gray area." [R. 1458-1461.] In a Docket Entry
made shortly after the motion was filed, the court stated, "This court is inclined to disqualify
himself because Beaslin has been involved, even though it was without knowledge of the
Court." [R. 1151] Voiding the judgment would inform trial courts that when a case presents
an appearance of impropriety and is in a gray area, all doubt should be resolved in favor of
recusal. Should the Court not vacate judgment, courts will be encouraged to refuse to recuse,
relying on fine distinctions and strained waiver arguments.
Finally, the third Liljeberg factor is satisfied because there is a high risk of
undermining the public's confidence, should no remedy be afforded. Our civil justice system
draws its authority from the people's faith in the system, which critically depends on impartial
judges and, more importantly, the appearance of impartial judges. Once that appearance
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evaporates, so does faith in the system. Public confidence can only be eroded if, despite the
appearance of impropriety, judgments of over a hundred thousand dollars can be entered
against a party by a judge whose firm represents the party in whose favor the judgment runs,
and who has a potential financial interest in the case. Vacating the judgment is the only
appropriate remedy.
CONCLUSION
The court should dismiss Syscom's Counterclaim because it is barred under U.C.A.
§ 58-55-604 (1995). It should also vacate the judgment in its entirety and remand for a new
trial solely on Cellcom's Complaint, with instructions that Judge Anderson recuse himself.
Finally, it should instruct the trial court to enter judgment for Cellcom for its attorneys' fees
under the mechanic's lien statute, U.C.A. § 38-1-18 (1995).

DATED this f

day of February, 1997.
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